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Abstract. Under cooperative federalism, when an identical tax tariff applies to all regions of a 
federation, usually redistribution rules are implemented to smooth fiscal differences. The 
administration of tax collection, however, is sometimes delegated to the regional level, 
leaving the regional administrations some discretion concerning the auditing of tax returns. 
Building on a stylized model, we show that under such conditions granted discretionary tax 
deductions at the level of tax units is positively related to state-specific marginal rates of loss 
(MRL), i.e., the fraction of an additional tax Euro raised in a region that the fiscal-
equalization system redistributes to other jurisdictions. We empirically test the model’s 
presumption using administrative income-tax micro data from Germany. Regression estimates 
comply with the implications of our model. 
 
JEL-Codes: C21, H21, H77 
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Fiscal equalization schemes are an important feature of public finance frameworks. Countries 
that have implemented fiscal equalization schemes include Canada, Switzerland, Australia 
and Germany. Theoretical research on fiscal federalism, touching the topic from different 
angles, has a long tradition. Pioneering works on the assignment of functions to different 
governmental layers and of the appropriate fiscal instruments date back to Musgrave (1959) 
and Oates (1972). The role of inter-regional spillover effects due to mobile tax bases or inter-
regional externalities in the provision of public goods has been investigated, for example, in 
Oates, 1972, Boadway and Flatters, 1982, or Manasse and Schultz, 1999. Other scholars study 
the issue of asymmetric information over local preferences for public goods (e.g. Cremer et 
al., 1996, or Bucovetsky et al., 1998), over technologies for the provision of public goods (e.g. 
Boadway et al., 1995, Raff and Wilson, 1997, and Caplan et al., 2000, Breuillé and Gary-
Bobo, 2007, Akai and Silva, 2009), or over local tax bases (Bordignon et al., 2001). 
In the present work, we explore the interplay between fiscal equalization, asymmetric 
information and regional tax policy from an empirical perspective by exploiting some 
particularities inherent in Germany’s fiscal-equalization system. First, Germany has a 
cooperative federal system where tariffs and bases of fiscally important taxes are set by the 
central government. Both tariffs and bases are the same in all German Laender. Second, a 
system of redistributive horizontal and vertical transfers is implemented to offset fiscal 
imbalances across regions (the German “states”).1 Effectively, the system imposes an implicit 
tax on states’ tax revenues: A state that raises an additional tax Euro expands its public budget 
only by a small fraction of the same Euro, while the larger fraction is horizontally or vertically 
redistributed according to various transfer rules. This implicit marginal tax on states’ tax 
revenues, also called the “marginal rate of loss” (MRL), can easily exceed 80 percent, and it 
differs substantially across German states and time. Third, the administrative process of 
collecting the fiscally important taxes, including the income tax, is delegated to the German 
states. 
If the states know their tax bases better than the central government or the latter has no 
perfect control over the tax collection process, such a setting may lead to a moral hazard 
problem: As states do not bear the full costs and not reap all of the benefits of their economic 
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activities, they may respond to these fiscal externalities by adjusting their local policies.2 This 
may give rise to inefficient local policies in terms of overall costs and benefits to society (see, 
for example, Oates, 1999, and Bordignon et al., 2001).  
For Germany, Baretti et al. (2002) address this moral hazard problem, pointing out that 
high MRL may undermine states’ willingness to administer tax collection effectively. Yet, 
due to data limitations, the authors did not perform a direct empirical test of their conjecture 
(Baretti et al., 2002, 639). The relationship between MRL and locally decided taxes is 
addressed in Buettner (2006) and Egger et al. (2009). Their framework is distinct from ours as 
local tax rates are set by the local governments while, in our case, the same tax tariff and 
definition of tax basis apply in all regions. Buettner (2006) finds that the rate of loss has a 
significant positive impact on the local tax rate; similar Egger et al. (2009) find a significant 
effect of a change in a local equalizing transfer formula on local business tax policy.  
In practice, the delegation of tax collection to the states opens up several possibilities 
of strategic behavior (Mikesell, 2003, Esteller-Moré, 2005, Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev, 
2005, and Libman and Feld, 2007). This concerns the training and instruction of taxmen by 
the states’ ministries of finance, and the endowment of revenue authorities. State-specific 
auditing rates of income millionaires’ tax declarations in Germany, for example, vary between 
five and almost 40 percent (Schick 2011). Moreover, the delegation may lead to inter-state 
differences in the treatment of income tax deductions. This reasoning particularly holds for 
so-called discretionary income tax deductions. Such deductions share a common feature: they 
are subject to vague legal terms (“unbestimmte Rechtsbegriffe”). Accordingly, taxmen have 
some freedom when interpreting the case-specific peculiarities determining the actual level of 
granted deductions (for a detailed discussion see Vogel, 2000, 73-75). By the level of granted 
discretionary deductions, states may align effective tax burdens of their local residents with 
MRL (see also Stöwhase and Traxler, 2005).  
In a Samuelson (1954) type of a local public good model with state-specific public 
budget constraints reflecting the mechanics of Germany’s fiscal equalization system, we show 
that a state planner who seeks to maximize the utility of the regional tax payers responds to a 
rise of the MRL with a lowering of the effective tax burdens, and this can be achieved, despite 
centrally defined tax laws, by granting more discretionary deductions. The rational behind this 
logic is straightforward: the higher a state’s MRL, the higher are the opportunity costs – the 
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 See Bordignon et al., 2001, for a theoretical examination of the issue of asymmetric information and optimal 
redistribution among regions of a federation. For Germany-specific peculiarities, see also Baretti et al., 2002, 
Buettner, 2006, and Egger et al., 2009.  
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additional tax burdens that have to be imposed on the state residents – in order to finance an 
additional unit of a locally provided public good. 
Recent releases of millions of administrative micro-data on income tax returns, 
provided by the German Federal Statistical Office, open up new possibilities for micro-
econometric analyses of the relationship between MRL and a state’s willingness to collect 
income taxes. These data include detailed information on the tax units’ incomes, tax burdens, 
granted tax deductions, and other information that is relevant for the calculation of the units’ 
tax burdens. So, it is feasible to assess the impact of MRL on granted income tax deductions 
after controlling for the specific tax-relevant individual characteristics of each tax unit. We 
econometrically assess the effect of MRL on discretionary deductions employing Heckman-
two stage and three-step censored quantile regression techniques. Estimates indicate that the 
level of discretionary deductions being granted by the state tax authorities is positively related 
with MRL. As a result, according to our 2004 point estimates, a five percentage point 
reduction of all states’ MRL levels would increase income tax revenue in Germany by some 
0.8 billion EUR. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces 
Germany’s federal system. Section 3 presents our theoretical model, and the empirical 
analysis follows in Sections 4 to 6: Our database is described in Section 4, Section 5 
introduces the econometric techniques, and specifications of regressions together with 
estimation results follow in Section 6. Finally, Chapter 7 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2 Federalism in Germany 
2.1 The fiscal-equalization system 
Germany’s federal structure is reflected by three governmental layers, the federal (Bund), the 
states (Bundesländer), and the local level (Gemeinde). Since the German reunification in 
1990, sixteen Laender form the state level and about 11,500 municipalities the local level. The 
system is cooperative in the sense that the important taxes are set by the central government 
while redistributive horizontal and vertical transfers serve for offsetting fiscal imbalances 
across the states to ensure that levels of public goods and services are similar (Art. 107, Para. 
2, 1, German Federal Constitution). Essentially, these grants channel funds from relatively 
wealthy states to poorer ones. Grant levels depend on state-specific “fiscal capacities” and 
“needs”. Essentially, a state’s fiscal capacity is equivalent to its tax return per inhabitant 
(before equalization), while fiscal needs are defined as average tax return per inhabitant 
across all the 16 states. 
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Only a small fraction of German states’ total tax revenue comes from own-source 
taxes such as inheritance, property acquisition, or lottery taxes. The predominant fraction 
stems from so-called joint taxes (income, corporation and value added tax), whose revenues 
are shared among the federal, state and local level. In year 2009, for example, the joint taxes 
made up about 71 percent of total tax revenue.3 The initial assignment of joint taxes by means 
of politically determined division rules constitutes the first of Germany’s 4-stage fiscal 
equalization system.4  
At stage 2 (Umsatzsteuervorwegausgleich), up to 25 percent of each state’s VAT 
revenue is horizontally (re)distributed in order to ensure that each state receives at least 92 
percent of average per capita tax revenue of all states (mainly the states’ shares of income and 
corporate taxes and some state taxes). 
Stage 3 is the horizontal “equalization system in the strict sense” 
(Länderfinanzausgleich im engeren Sinne): fiscal resources from financially strong states are 
transferred to financially weak states. Levels of horizontal payments/transfers depend on how 
much the state’s fiscal revenue per (virtual)5 capita deviates from the interstate average. Apart 
from the state’s share of income and value added tax, fiscal revenue includes the revenue of 
pure state taxes like inheritance or beer tax and 50 percent of the most important local taxes’ 
revenue, i.e. local business tax and ground tax. After the third stage, each state receives at 
least 95 percent of the average (per capita) fiscal revenue. 
Stage 4 involves vertical transfers from the federal to the state level, so-called 
Fehlbetragsbundesergänzungszuweisungen, granted to states when fiscal revenue after stages 
1 to 3 still falls below the inter-state average. These grants are uncommitted and cover at least 
90 percent of the remaining gap between fiscal revenue and fiscal need. Accordingly, all 
states effectively end up with 99.5 percent of average per capita fiscal revenue.  
In addition, special needs grants (Sonderbedarfsbundesergänzungszuweisungen) 
compensate for special fiscal burdens some states have to bear. These grants come from the 
federal level and are given lump-sum, regardless of fiscal or economic performance. 
 
Table 1 about here 
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 From the remaining 29 percent, 17 percent of the revenue account for the federal layer. Federal taxes include 
energy taxes, motor vehicle taxes, various consumer taxes (e.g., tobacco, alcohol and insurance taxes) and the 
solidarity surcharge. Roughly some three percent of total tax revenue is state taxes. The remaining eight percent 
account for the local level in form of real estate, business and some local consumption taxes (Bundesministerium 
der Finanzen, 2010). 
4
 The equalization system partly changed from 2005 onwards. As our data are only available up to 2004 we 
describe the equalization system valid at that time. However the main mechanisms remained in place. 
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Stages 1-4 drive a substantial wedge between states’ tax revenue before and after 
fiscal equalization. Effectively, the system imposes an implicit marginal tax, the marginal rate 
of loss (MRL), on states’ tax revenues, both for rich (net contributor) and for poor (net 
recipient) states. For a net contributor, higher tax revenue implies higher contribution 
payments, so that, after redistribution, its revenues rise only by a fraction of the original rise 
in tax revenue. For a net recipient, higher state tax revenue implies lower transfers.6 In both 
cases, only part of the additional revenue can be internalized. 
We have derived year- and state-specific MRL by means of a simulation model of 
Germany’s fiscal equalization system.7 For the period of interest, the model reflects all the 
relevant regulations as codified in Germany’s fiscal equalization law, and relies on state-level 
data as provided by Germany’s Federal Statistical Office. Table 2 provides the year- and state 
specific MRL levels for variations of income tax revenue.8 In the case of financially strong 
states, MRL reflects the marginal contribution of the state to VAT redistribution and to 
interstate redistribution (stage 2 and 3). For financially weak states, MRL basically reflects 
the reduction in overall transfers received due to a rise in state-specific income tax revenue. 
The reduction of transfers consists of lower transfers from VAT redistribution, lower 
interstate transfers and lower vertical grants (stage 2 to 4). 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Results from Table 2 indicate that MRL are high in general and vary both over states 
and time. With the only exception of Schleswig-Holstein in year 1998, it never falls below 70 
percent. The specific design of Germany’s fiscal equalization system implies that a state’s 
MRL is the lowest, i.e. 42.5 percent, if its fiscal capacity coincides with the average fiscal 
capacity in all the states. Then MRL reflects division rules from step 1, the initial assignment 
of joint taxes. Every deviation from mean fiscal capacity leads to a sharp rise of MRL. This is 
shown by Figures 1a-c, giving state-specific levels of MRL for different levels of state-
specific per-capita income tax revenue (before fiscal redistribution rules are applied). An 
abscissa value of “0” indicates the status quo (no deviation from actual income tax revenue), 
while the value “+10” (“-10”) indicates an increase (decrease) of per capita income tax 
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 A detailed description of the German financial constitution provides Plachta, 2008. 
7
 Information on the simulations can be provided by the authors upon request. 
8
 MRL is the same for a marginal change in income and corporate tax revenue, while it can be different for other 
types of taxes. 
 7 
 
revenue by EUR 10. A change in income tax revenue also changes the fiscal capacity of the 
respective state. The ordinate then provides MRL as a function of revenue variations.  
For example, the upper left graph in Figure 1a shows responses of North-Rhine-
Westphalia’s MRL in 1998 to changes in its income tax revenue. For the actual level of 
income tax revenue in 1998 (abscissa is zero), North-Rhine-Westphalia’s MRL is 71 percent. 
The number complies with the corresponding entry in Table 2. It can also be seen from the 
Figure that North-Rhine-Westphalia is a net contributor. The minimum MRL complies with a 
per capita tax revenue that falls below the actual level.  
Unfortunately, it is not feasible to express MRL by means of a simple closed form. 
Any variation of a state’s characteristics (e.g., tax revenue, number of inhabitants) precipitates 
itself in stages 2 to 4 of the transfer system, and it is not feasible to “derive a simple formula 
which summarizes these effects” (Baretti et al., 2002, p. 646).9 However, the graphs indicate 
that (a) MRL is highly not linear in state tax revenue, and that (b) MRL usually changes very 
little for reasonable variations of income tax revenue. Only when a state’s fiscal capacity, by 
coincidence, is fairly close to the interstate average, realistic variations of income tax revenue 
may have a profound impact on MRL. Accordingly, we interpret MRL as exogeneous from 
the viewpoint of local governments, at least in the short run. That the income tax is only one 
out of several fiscally important taxes and that, of course, a variation in a single state’s tax 
revenue is relatively small compared to overall fiscal revenues across all states supports this 
presumption. 
 
Figures 1a-1c about here 
 
2.2 The process of income taxation 
The legislation of joint taxes and the responsibility concerning the administration of tax 
collection are assigned to different governmental layers. The tax-setting autonomy is allocated 
at the central level. Particularly, the central government defines both tax-tariffs and tax bases, 
while the states have no tax setting autonomy even if pure state taxes are affected.10 
Accordingly, the states’ possibilities to steer public revenue directly are heavily restricted.11 
Some indirect possibilities, however, exist as the administration of tax-collection is 
delegated to the states. Indeed, Vogel (2000, 91) argues that the monocracy of state financial 
executives opens up opportunities for a politically motivated practice of tax laws. He shows 
                                                 
9
 See Appendix 1 in Baretti et al. (2002) for details. 
10
 Except the rate of the property acquisition tax that can be determined by the states since 2006. 
11
 The reasons and incentives for raising public debt are discussed in Jochimsen and Nuscheler, 2010. 
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that systematic differences exist in state specific tax auditing frequencies and in additional tax 
revenue per audit (Vogel, 2000, 128-155), although national basic standards exist concerning 
the endowment of tax collecting agencies, training of taxmen, and the technical procedures of 
tax collection. Recently, a risk management system has been installed in all states’ tax offices. 
It evaluates roughly 2,500 positions in income tax returns, and indicates incongruities. 
However, states adjusted the detection algorithm independently, or acted differently once an 
incongruity had been detected by the system (Bundesrechnungshof 2009, 176-179). In 
Hamburg for example, a so-called city state12 with many income millionaires, the auditing of 
millionaires’ income tax returns is substantially lower than in other states (Schick 2011). 
Furthermore, Vogel (2000) provides several empirical cases where certain tax payers had 
been treated preferentially by the states. Examples include generous interpretation of 
amortization rules or the postponement of tax payments.  
 
3 A stylized model 
Our model relies on Samuelson’s (1954) static public good model, where the state-specific 
public budget constraints, in addition we have incorporated the central elements of Germany’s 
fiscal equalization system. 
Consider a country with 1,...,j J=  federal state and let a state j  have three sources of 
revenues: income-tax revenue,13 equalizing grants, and lump sum transfers feasible for the 
provision of a region-wide public good provided at the level jg . Transfer rules determining 
the equalizing grants, jZ , and the lump sum transfers jB , and also the tax tariff, τ , are set by 
a central planner (whose goal might be the maximization of overall societal welfare). These 
rules, characterized by ( ) ( )1 1, ,..., , ,...,J JZ Z B Bτ   , are decided before taxes have actually 
been collected, and before public goods have been provided. Consistent with the situation in 
Germany we assume that the administrative process of tax collection is delegated to the 
federal states who interpret ( ) ( )1 1, ,..., , ,...,J JZ Z B Bτ    as exogenous (henceforth indicated by 
vertical bars). We further assume that tax units (and the tax bases) are immobile and that 
taxable income is equal across all tax payers in the same federal state. 
Using the public good as the numéraire, in a static one-period model the budget 
constraint of state j  is given by, 
                                                 
12
 Three German cities (Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg) are also independent federal states. 
13
 We abstain from modeling other tax types to keep the analysis simple. 
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( )1 j j j jg T Z B≤ + + ,  
with 
( ) ( )2 , ,j j j j jT r n t yτ= ⋅ ⋅ ∆ , 
where jT  denotes income tax revenue after the initial assignment of taxes according to 
division rules in stage 1 of Germany’s fiscal equalization system. The term 0.575r ≈  gives 
the share from income tax revenue which is assigned to the state level (including the state’s 
municipalities), jn  is the number of residents, and ( ), ,j j jt yτ ∆  is the effective tax burden 
imposed on a representative tax unit with gross income jy . The tax burden imposed on a tax 
unit depends both on the income tax tariff, which is progressive in Germany, and 
discretionary deductions being granted, j∆ . The second term in the state’s budget constraint 
is the level of equalizing transfers a state receives or contributes, 
















=∑ ɺ . F denotes 
other particular regulations inherent in Germany’s fiscal equalization system. The third term 
in the state’s budget constraint, jB  are lump sum vertical transfers, i.e. special need grants. 
 For the tax unit, we assume that preferences are characterized by an additive utility 
function of the form, 
( ) ( )(4) j j j j jU u c h g= + ,  
with jc  denoting the level of private consumption, and with jg  denoting the level of a 
locally-provided public good. Accordingly, we abstain from modeling public good spillover 
effects. The budget constraint of a tax unit is, 






with p  being the price of the private good, assumed to be identical across regions. 
Combining equations (1) to (5), we obtain, 










Given ( ) ( )1 1, ,..., , ,...,J JZ Z B Bτ    and an interior solution exists, a benevolent state planner 
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The modified Samuelson condition (8) requires that the sum of marginal rates of 
substitution between the public and the private good is equal to the price ratio times the 






= − + ⋅  ∂ 
. This has 
immediate implications for the optimal level of discretionary deductions, *j∆ , from the 
viewpoint of the benevolent state planner. For example, consider a situation when a state 
planner faces a situation where the state-specific marginal rate of loss, ceteris paribus, rises, 
so that the right hand side of equation (8) goes up. Then, in the optimum, also the sum of 
marginal rates of substitution is higher. This is guaranteed if the state residents’ consumption 
level of the private good, jc , relative to jg  rises. This again requires a low individual tax 
burden which is secured when discretionary deductions being granted are increased. With the 
same reasoning, *j∆  is lower when the marginal rate of loss is lower.
14
 Equation (8) also 
indicates that the state planner does not consider the effect of its policy on other states’ 
budgets: Every variation of j∆  alters the state’s tax revenue ex ante to fiscal equalization, and 
thus the grant levels of all other states. This fiscal externality implies an inefficient local 
policy in terms of overall costs and benefits to society. The following empirical sections 
scrutinize whether the positive relationship between a state’s MRL and j∆  is actually 
supported by the data. 
 
4 Database and key figures 
4.1 Germany’s “Factually Anonymous Income Tax Statistic” 
                                                 
14
 The argumentation requires that variations of discretionary deductions and corresponding changes in income 
tax revenue have only moderate effects on MRL. As Figures 1a-c indicated, this is not a too strong assumption. 
Only in the exceptional case when a state’s fiscal capacity approaches the average fiscal capacity in all states, 
changes in fiscal capacity lead to substantial MRL variations. Moreover, discretionary deductions compared to 
actual income tax base are relatively small (see Tables 3a and 3b). It must also be ensured that the substitution 
effect always dominates the income effect. 
 11 
 
Germany’s Income Tax Statistic (Lohn- und Einkommensteuerstatistik) provides income-tax 
returns from about 30 million tax units per assessment year. It conveys information on taxable 
income, family situation, income sources, granted deductions and exemptions, revenues and 
sources of revenues, income tax burden, etc. From all the tax units, a 10 percent stratified 
random sample is made available for scientific purposes, the so-called Factually Anonymous 
Income Tax Statistic (Faktisch anonymisierte Lohn- und Einkommensteuerstatistik, FAST). 
So far, FAST cross sections have been provided in form of scientific-use-files 
containing data for the assessment years 1998, 2001, and 2004. These three cross sections 
form our database. Long delays in releasing the data are for two reasons. First, tax units have 
an extensive period to file their income tax statement, and afterwards the statement has to be 
audited and processed by the tax collecting authority. For extensive and/or complex income 
tax statements the whole process can easily take five years. Second, once the taxation process 
is completed, the data must be assembled by the state statistical offices and forwarded to the 
federal statistical office, where the scientific use files are prepared. 
FAST allows the identification of all kinds of granted deductions. We have classified 
these deductions in non-discretionary and discretionary deductions. Non-discretionary 
deductions are lump sum deductions and deductions based on automatisms following well-
defined legal terms (“bestimmter Rechtsbegriff”): Once a specific requirement 
(“Tatbestandsmerkmal der Besteuerung”) is met (e.g., having a tax-relevant child or paying 
church taxes), the deduction is granted. As a result, non-discretionary deductions leave hardly 
any room for taxmen to manipulate income tax burdens. However, the case is different for 
discretionary deductions. In contrast to non-discretionary deductions, discretionary deductions 
mutually share the feature that they are subject to vague legal terms (“unbestimmte 
Rechtsbegriffe”). Accordingly, taxmen have some discretion concerning the interpretation of 
the case-relevant facts that determine the actual level of granted deductions (for a detailed 
discussion see Vogel, 2000, 73-75). For example, the level of expenses exceeding blanket 
allowances and qualified as deductible, despite some guidelines, is a decision ex aequo et 
bono of the auditing taxman. Therefore, discretionary deductions can serve as a measure how 
strict tax returns are audited by the local taxman. Over our observation period (1998 to 2004) 
several paragraphs of Germany’s income tax law have changed. Sometimes, these 
modifications also concern paragraphs relating to discretionary deductions. To ensure inter-
temporal consistency of discretionary deductions, which will serve as our willingness-to-tax 
indicator, we have restricted our attention to kinds of discretionary deductions that are inter-
temporally comparable, i.e. where the tax law remained unchanged or changed only 
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marginally. A summary of the set of discretionary deductions considered in the empirical 
analysis can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
4.2 Descriptive figures of our micro database 
Descriptive statistics of FAST variables used in adjacent regression analyses are summarized 
in Tables 3a and 3b. Table 3a refers to unmarried while Table 3b refers to married tax units. 
By year and state, the tables provide means and standard deviations of taxable bases before 
discretionary deductions, TB , and of discretionary deductions. All monetary amounts are 
expressed in year 2004 prices. The tables also give the number of observations and the share 
of tax units with strictly positive discretionary deductions.  
 
Tables 3a and 3b about here 
 
Taxable base before discretionary deductions is the central micro-level conditioning 
variable in regression analysis. It has a profound impact on the level of discretionary 
deductions, and it is exogeneous from the viewpoint of states’ taxmen. Across the states, 
average TB  is the highest for Hamburg and Hesse, and the lowest in Thuringia. Over time, 
the data indicate a slight decrease in price-adjusted taxable bases. This is due to the fact that 
the blanket allowance for employment-related expenses has been reduced between year 2001 
and 2004, so that now more tax units with low incomes than before have an incentive to 
declare their incomes. 
 Conditional averages of discretionary deductions for unmarried tax units in year 1998, 
for example, range between €1,400 (Saarland) and €2,235 (North Rhine-Westphalia). It is, 
however, not necessarily true that average discretionary deductions are high in “rich” and 
“low” in poor states. For example, take Bavaria and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania in year 
2004. While Bavaria’s average taxable base is about €13,500, average discretionary 
deductions in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania exceed the level in Bavaria by about €250. 
Concerning unmarried and married tax units, married tax units benefit from 
substantially higher discretionary deductions. This is due to the fact that married couples have 
higher incomes compared to singles. The fraction of married tax units with strictly positive 
discretionary deductions is also higher than for unmarried units: about 80 percent vs. 70 
percent. For the remaining non-trivial part of the sub-samples, discretionary deductions have 
not been declared by the taxpayer (be it that the tax burden was already zero or no legal basis 
 13 
 
existed for the declaration of discretionary deductions), or have been declared but not even a 
single EUR has been granted (which should be an exception). 
Figure 2 gives a graphical representation of the conditional distribution of the 
dependent variable in regression analysis, the natural logarithm of discretionary deductions 
(excluding cases with discretionary deductions being zero). In Figure 2, three lines are 
provided, one per cross section. The density function reaches its maximum around for a level 
of discretionary deductions around €1,100 ( ( )ln 1,100 7≈ ). For several tax units, granted 
discretionary deductions reach values of more then €20,000 ( ( )ln 20,000 9.9≈ ). Over the 
observation period, the distributions of discretionary deductions have changed only little, 
indicating that the aggregate conveys inter-temporally consistent information: modifications 
of the income tax law had no systematic effect on the aggregate. For married tax units, 
discretionary deductions have always been divided by two. This division is congruent with the 
fiscal effects of Germany’s splitting boon: When a taxman audits a tax return of an unmarried 
tax unit and grants a marginal amount of discretionary deductions, the taxable base falls by 
the same amount, and the effect on tax revenue is the change in the taxable base times the 
marginal tax rate. For married tax units, effects are different. Due to the splitting boon, the 
change in tax base is divided by two, then the tax tariff is applied, and the change in the unit’s 
tax burden is derived by doubling the respective amount. As Germany’s income tax tariff is 
progressive, the fiscal loss of an additionally granted tax Euro, ceteris paribus, is typically 
higher for unmarried compared to married couples. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Figure 3 gives the same frequency distribution, now disaggregated at the state level. 
Black solid curves refer to state specific distribution in the respective year and, as a 
benchmark, distributions for Germany as a whole are provided (dashed lines). For all states, 
distributions of log discretionary deductions over time change very little. However, there are 
some apparent differences in the shapes of the distributions across states. Most prominent are 
the particularly shaped two-peak distributions for the Saarland. In adjacent regression 
analyses we scrutinize whether MRL is a suited candidate for explaining inter-state 
differences in discretionary deductions after conditioning for control variables. 
 




5 Econometric models 
5.1 Heckman selection model 
Due to the large number of observations with discretionary deductions being zero, OLS or 
other comparable techniques are not appropriate for our purposes. Moreover, excluding all 
those cases from the analysis may lead to biased estimates because it is conceivable that – 
also after controlling for regressors – those tax units with 0∆ =  are not randomly selected. 
For example, low-income households may not declare (all) deductions because their taxable 
income is already zero. For low income households, also the tax administrator may not be 
willing to invest time to control the claimed deductions as the tax burden of the tax unit, so or 
so, is already zero. Dealing properly with the censoring issue in empirical analysis, therefore, 
is of considerable importance. Particularly, it is not appropriate to assume that the same 
probability mechanism generates both zero and positive values of ∆  (see Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2009, p. 538). 
The Heckman selection model (see Gronau, 1974; Lewis, 1974; and Heckman, 1976) 
allows for the possibility that probability mechanisms differ. To keep the explanations and 
formulae simple, we suppress individual and period subscripts. The Heckman selection model 
(HSM) is a two-step model. It assumes the existence of an underlying regression equation, the 
so-called outcome equation, which takes the standard form, 
( ) ( ) ' 19 ln i i i in X uβ∆ = + , 
where ( )ln n∆  is the national logarithm of n∆  when 0n∆ > .15 The vector iX  contains 
covariates characterizing tax unit i , and iu1  denotes the error term with ( )σ,0~1 Nu i . The 
dependent variable, however, is only observed if 
( ) ' 210 0i iX uγ + >  
where ( )1,0~2 Nu i  and ( ) ρ=ii uucorr 21 , . Equation (10) is referred to as the selection 
equation. Apparently, if 0≠ρ , standard regression techniques applied to the outcome 
equation will lead to biased regression coefficients. 
 
5.2 Three-step censored quantile regressions 
Another suitable candidate for our purposes is censored quantile regressions techniques. A 
particular strength of the quantile regresion technique is its flexibility compared to parametric 
                                                 
15
 We have taken the logarithm of discretionary deductions as well of the taxable base before discretionary 
deductions as distributions of both variables have a long right tail and are not normally distributed. 
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regression techniques.16 Particularly, quantile regressions can provide information about the 
relationship between the outcome and the regressors at different points in the conditional 
distribution of the outcome, thereby allowing deeper insights in the data. In our case, for 
example, it is not ruled out that the relationship between discretionary deductions and MRL is 
not the same at different levels of discretionary deductions. Standard regression techniques 
fail in providing such information, but reveal the general relationship between the outcome 
and the covariate. Also, the method is more robust to outliers than standard (mean) regression 
techniques. 
To control for the issue of censoring, we apply a three-step censored quantile 
regression estimator suggested by Chernozhukov and Hong (2002). The idea of the three-step 
estimator is to first select a subsample from the whole sample for which the conditional 
quantile falls in the observed part of the distribution. These observations are selected by 
estimating the probabilities of not being censored, ( )
*
ln 0i ih X P X
n









denoting the non-censored level of discretionary deductions. For a quantile q  of the 
distribution of discretionary deductions, we then take the observations for which 
( ) 1ih X q> − .17 We carry out step 1 by estimating the logit model, 
( ) ( )'11 ,i i ip X uη γ= +  
with iη  denoting the probability of discretionary deductions to be positive. As (11) is possibly 
mis-specified, it is recommended not to select all observations with ( )' ˆ 1ip X qγ > −  but only 
the fraction ( )' ˆ 1ip X q tγ > − + , with 0 t q< <  denoting the trimming parameter.18 The second 
step consists of running a quantile regression on the selected and trimmed subsample ( )J t , 
( ) ( )
( )
'
012 min ln iq i






−     
∑ , 
where qς  is the check function, 
                                                 
16
 Of course, also quantile regressions suffer from drawbacks. First, there exist no closed form formulas with 
explicit solutions for the estimators making it harder to derive e.g. the asymptotic properties. Second, the 
estimates are derived with time-consuming numerical methods, which also may converge to a local optimum 
instead of a global optimum. 
17
 Accordingly, it is ensured that in the selected subsample the fraction of observations with positive 
discretionary deductions is larger than (1-q), and that the conditional q-th quantile exists and exceeds the 
censoring point. 
18
 According to Chernozhukov and Hong, 2002, a selection of 90 percent of the sub-sample worked well in 
simulations and we followed their advice. 
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The check function weights positive errors by q , and negative errors by 1q − . The estimate 
( )0 qβ  of ( )qβ  is consistent, yet not efficient because the trimmed subsample is not the 
largest subsample. In order to obtain the largest subsample with ( )' 0iX qβ > , we use the fact 
that ( )0ˆ qβ  is consistent and select all observations with ( )' 0ˆ 0iX qβ > . Then the third step is 
carried out by running standard quantile regression on the subsample selected at the end of 
step two. The result is a consistent estimation ( )1ˆ qβ of ( )qβ .19 
 
6 Specification and estimation results 
6.1 Specification of regressions 
Suppressing individual, state and period subscripts, the basic structure of all the estimation 
equations is, 
( ) 0 1 2 3 414 State Period Micro Interaction errorβ β β β β+ + + + + . 
State  is a set of state-level variables, e.g. the marginal rate of loss and levels of per-capita 
lump-sum grants. Period  includes two period dummies for years 2001 and 2004. Micro  
comprises several characteristics of the tax units, e.g. taxable income before discretionary 
deductions, or number of tax-relevant children.20 Finally, Interaction  contains interactions 
between micro-level variables and the period dummies.  
To check for robustness, we fitted four specifications (S1-S4) of the HSM using 
different sets of variables. For the three-step censored quantile regressions, we provide results 
                                                 
19
 The entire paragraph relies on Chernozhukov and Hong, 2002. See Chernozhukov and Hong, 2002, for further 
details on three-step censored quantile regressions. 
20
 For robust identification of HSM, an exclusion restriction should be imposed: the selection equation should 
include at least one exogeneous variable not being included in the outcome equation. Ideally, the excluded 
variable should have a substantial impact on the probability of selection but a negligible impact on the outcome 
(see Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, p. 546). A suitable candidate for our purposes is marital status. In year 1998 
(2001, 2004), we observe strictly positive amounts of discretionary deductions for 66.66 (71.18, 71.39) percent 
of the unmarried and 83.56 (87.52, 88.00) percent for the married tax units. The conditional means of ln(/n) for 
unmarried and married tax units are fairly close: for year 1998 (2001, 2004) we have 6.65 vs. 6.37 (6.77 vs. 6.52; 
6.58 vs. 6.35). Due to the exclusion restriction, the set of individual-level variables in the selection equation is 
the same as Micro except that it also includes a dummy for married (jointly assessed) tax units. 
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for specification S4, the Heckman specification recommended according to the Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC, see Table 4).21 
For the Heckman model, the baseline specification (S1) includes a set of state-level 
variables, 1SState , and the micro-variable set 1SMicro  but not the set of interactions between 
individual characteristics and period dummies. Particularly, 1SState includes:  
1. 
,s tMRL , the marginal rate of loss in state s in period t . If the respective regression 
coefficient is positive, it supports the relationship implied by equation (8) from our theoretical 
model. 
2. 
,s tContributor , taking the value 1 for the states’ net contributing to equalization (Bavaria, 
Baden-Württemberg, Hamburg, and Hesse).22 The corresponding regression coefficient 
controls for potential differences in discretionary deductions between net contributing and net 
recipient states. 
3. sCitystate , taking the value 1 for the city states Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg. The 
respective coefficient controls, for example, for the particular fiscal needs of city states 
compared to non-city states, e.g. due to a rather small population. Together with the variable 
,s tContributor , this gives us a set of four groups of countries. 
4. 
, ,s t s tMRL Contributor× , an interaction which is 0 for all net recipient states, and equal to the 
state-specific marginal rates of loss in case of the net contributing states. The corresponding 
regression coefficient quantifies potential differences in the relationship between MRL and 
the level of discretionary deductions between net contributor and recipient states. 
5. 
,s t sMRL Citystate× , an interaction which is 0 for the 13 non-city states, and equal to the 
state-specific marginal rates of loss in case of city states. The corresponding regression 
coefficient quantifies potential differences in the relationship between MRL and the level of 
discretionary deductions for city-states compared with non-city states. 
6. 
,s tLumpsum , the annual per capita vertical lump sum transfer (in €1,000) granted to state 
s in period t . According to our theoretical model, the respective regression coefficients 
should be zero. 
1SMicro  comprises the taxable base before discretionary deductions (in logs), ln( )TB .  
                                                 
21
 This is solely for technical reasons: The large sample size led to extensive computing times of more than 12 
hours per percentile. 
22
 In year 1998, Schleswig-Holstein was another net contributor. For the three periods of interest, Schleswig-
Holstein is the only country with a switch of status from net contributor to net recipient (or vice versa). 
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Specification S2 is the same as S1 with the only exception that 2SMicro  (compared 
with 1SMicro ) further includes the number of tax-relevant children and age dummies of the 
taxpayer. In Specification S3, the set of micro-variables also comprises the income shares of 
different income sources. In specification S4 all micro-variables from S3 are also interacted 
with the two period dummies. 
 
6.2 Results from regressions 
Results from the four Heckman regressions are summarized in Table 4. To adjust standard 
errors for intra-group correlation, regressions are always clustered at the state level.23 The 
upper panel of Table 4 provides the coefficient estimates and respective standard errors for 
the outcome equation, while estimates for the selection equation are summarized in the lower 
panel. Underneath the bottom panel, three summary statistics are reported. The statistic 
( )1 2,corr u uρ = gives the correlation of errors in the outcome and the selection equation. That 
the statistic is significantly different from zero in all specifications indicates a positive 
correlation between error terms in the selection and outcome equation. Accordingly, standard 
regression techniques applied to the outcome equation would yield biased estimates. The λ  
term, the product of ρ  with the standard error of the residual in the outcome equation, 
conveys complementary information. The 2χ  statistic is the comparison of the joint 
likelihood of an independent probit model for the selection equation and a regression model 
on the observed discretionary deductions against the Heckman model likelihood. Together, 
estimates of ρ ,λ , 2χ  clearly justify the Heckman equation with the data. For model 
selection, we have also provided the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) which introduces a 
penalty term for the number of parameters in the model. According to BIC, specification S4 is 
recommended. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
An immediate observation from the outcome regressions in Table 4 is that MRL  and 
granted discretionary deductions are positively related. The finding is significant at the 1 
percent level in all four specifications, supporting the implications from the Samuelson 
condition (8) in the theoretical model. The estimates from the selection equation further 
support this assessment. We also find that the probability for discretionary deductions being 
                                                 
23
 For correction of standard errors in pooled micro-macro datasets see Moulton, 1990. 
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granted is increasing in MRL . It should, however, be noted that the positive relationship 
between MRL  and the level of deductions is a phenomenon most prominent in the non-
contributing states. The regression coefficients pertaining to MRL Contributor×  is negative 
and it is quantitatively close to the regression coefficients for MRL , thus mitigating the 
quantitative effect of MRL  on discretionary deductions. For the city states, the interaction 
MRL Citystate×  reveals no differences compared with the non-city states regarding the 
impact of MRL . 
Another remarkable result refers to the lump-sum transfers, Lumpsum . According to 
our theoretical model in Section 2, lump-sum transfers should not affect the level of 
discretionary deductions granted by the taxmen. Indeed, our regression analysis renders 
supportive evidence. In the outcome equation the regression coefficient for Lumpsum  is 
quantitatively small and only marginally significant. In the selection equation, Lumpsum  
plays no role. 
Results from the quantile regressions give further supportive evidence on the positive 
relationship between MRL and discretionary deductions. Figure 4 gives a graphical summary 
of the results for the set of state-level variables, 1SState , and also for the micro-variable 
taxable base. Due to censoring, it was not possible to derive quantile coefficients for the low 
quantiles (1 to 25). Solid lines denote the 3-step estimates, while the shaded area depicts 95 
percent confidence intervals.24 Consistent with the results from the Heckman model, 
regression coefficients pertaining MRL are again positive and significant. Furthermore, the 
quantile regression indicates an inverse-u-relationship between MRL and discretionary 
deductions across quantiles. For the quantiles in the middle of the distribution, the effect of 
MRL on discretionary deductions appears to be particularly strong, while it is weaker for the 
extreme quintiles of non-censored data. 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
Two further robustness checks on the MRL-∆  relationship can be found in the 
Appendix. First, we have rerun Heckman specification S4 but instead of the macro-variable 
set we have included 15 state dummies (Baden-Württemberg serves as the reference). The 
corresponding regression coefficients reveal between-state differences in discretionary 
deductions after controlling for tax units’ individual characteristics. We have implemented 
                                                 
24
 Percentile-specific confidence intervals reveal whether regression coefficients are different from zero. They 
are not suited for making visual tests of parameter constancy. 
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this approach separately for each of our three cross sections (and, therefore discarded the 
period dummies), and then computed the correlation between the regression coefficients for 
the state dummies and MRL. Correlations are always positive, thus supporting our previous 
conclusions: 0.173 for year 1998 (without city states: 0.424), 0.226 for year 2001 (without 
city states: 0.525), and 0.338 for year 2004 (without city states: 0.486). Second, we have rerun 
specifications S1 to S4 excluding Schleswig-Holstein. As can be seen from Table 2, 
Schleswig-Holstein’s marginal rate of loss was exceptionally low in year 1998, so that 
Heckman regression estimates may be biased. However, Table A3 in the Appendix reveals 
that the exclusion of Schleswig-Holstein has a quite moderate effect on regression estimates, 
and does not change our previous conclusions.25 
 
6.3 Reactions of income tax revenue to hypothetical MRL variations 
We conclude our empirical examination with predictions of changes in state-specific tax 
revenue (per tax unit and over all tax units) due to MRL variations. All estimates rely on the 
Heckman model and take the states’ actual MRL levels in a particular year as the reference 
point. More precisely, changes in tax revenue per tax unit are derived by first predicting for 
each observation the expected value of the dependent variable ( n∆ ) conditional on the 
dependent variable for a tax unit i  in period t  and resident in state s  being selected. Then the 
change in taxable base compared to the status quo is derived and multiplied with the tax unit’s 
marginal income tax rate.26 Using the frequency weights, we then derive the average change 
in income tax burden across all state residents. Multiplying the average change in income tax 
burden with the number of tax units gives the overall change in income tax revenue ex ante to 
redistribution in a particular state. The numbers we provide are derived from the point 
estimates of regression coefficients, and thus should be interpreted with sufficient care. 
 
Figures 5a-5c about here 
 
By year and state, Figures 5a to 5c provide estimates of additional tax revenues for 
particular MRL reductions (dMRL) compared with the status quo. Within each of the 16 
graphs for a particular year, two functions are provided: solid lines give the additional income 
                                                 
25
 We have also run separate OLS and probit regressions with bootstrap samples to get an idea of the sensitivity 
of confidence intervals to sample size (1,000 replications; five percent sub-samples). Bootstrapped standard 
errors of regression coefficients were always small. Particularly, confidence intervals for the MRL coefficient 
never included the zero. 
26
 In case of married couples, amounts are multiplied by two. 
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tax revenue per tax unit; dashed lines give the state-wide increase in overall income tax 
revenue in million EUR. All numbers are expressed in year 2004 prices. 
Take for example the graph for Lower Saxony in year 2004. The abscissa value “5” 
indicates a five percentage-point reduction in Lower Saxony’s year 2004 MRL, i.e. a 
reduction from 87.17 to 82.17 percent. The left ordinate indicates that the same reduction is 
associated with an estimated rise of income tax revenue per tax unit by EUR 39.33. The right-
hand side ordinate indicates that the reduction rises Lower Saxony’s income tax revenue 
(before redistribution) by 73 million EUR. Summing up, for dMRL=5 percent, the state-
specific changes in total income tax revenue amount to 992 million EUR in year 1998, 963 
million EUR in year 2001, and 799 million EUR in year 2004. 
 
7 Conclusion 
In many federal countries, fiscal-equalization schemes have been installed to soften fiscal 
imbalances across states. Various theoretical works have investigated the incentive effects 
associated with fiscal equalization in such a cooperative framework, but few papers have 
confronted the theory with evidence from micro data. The present study has provided new 
evidence in this direction. Particularly, using cross-sectional representative administrative 
micro data on income tax returns for Germany (for years 1998, 2001, 2004), we have 
estimated the relationship between state-specific marginal rates of loss and levels of granted 
discretionary deductions.  
Results from two-stage Heckman and three-step censored quantile techniques indicate 
a positive relationship between a state’s marginal rate of loss and the level of discretionary 
deductions granted by the state’s taxmen. According to our Heckman estimates, a reduction of 
year 2004 state-specific levels of MRL of 5 percentage points would lead to an increase of 
income tax revenue per tax unit of about EUR 30 in Hamburg and about EUR 60 in Saarland. 
This is equivalent to an estimated rise in Germany-wide income tax income revenue of about 
0.8 billion EUR. 
To resolve the issue of unwanted state-specific policies concerning the treatment of 
discretionary income tax deductions, a possibility would be the delegation of tax collection to 
the federal level. In the last years, several initiatives have been set up in this direction. For 
example, in year 2007 a commission of German experts on federalism 
(“Föderalismuskommission II”) discussed the installation of a central tax collecting agency. In 
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variation of income tax revenue per capita (in Euro)
 
Note. Own computations. 
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Note. Own computations. 
 
 
















Note. Own computations. Database is FAST 1998-2004. 
 























































































































































































Note. Own computations. Database is FAST 1998-2004. 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Estimate CI at 95 percent level
 
Note. Own computations. Database is FAST 1998-2004. 
 






















































































































































































































































































































change in tax revenue per unit change in total tax revenue
 
Note. Own computations. Database is FAST 1998-2004. 
 






















































































































































































































































































































change in tax revenue per unit change in total tax revenue
 
Note. Own computations. Database is FAST 1998-2004. 
 


















































































































































































































































































































change in tax revenue per unit change in total tax revenue
 
Note. Own computations. Database is FAST 1998-2004. 
 
  
Table 1. Germany’s fiscal equalization system  
 
 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 







Instrument Revenue sharing of 
joint taxes (income, 
corporation, VAT) 








vinces (above average 
joint-tax-revenues) to 
financially weak ones 
(below average) 
 
Transfers from the 
federal government 
to provinces whose 
fiscal revenue is 
still below average. 
Result Fixed rate of loss for 
provinces, e.g. 42.5% 
for income tax re-
venue, i.e. they keep 
57.5% of income tax 
revenue. 
All provinces 
receive at least 
92% of average 
(per capita) tax 
revenue 
All provinces receive at 
least 95% of average 




receive at least 
99.5% of average 
(per capita) fiscal 
revenue 
Note. In addition to stage 1 to 4 some provinces receive special need grants that are paid lump-sum. 
 
 
Table 2. Marginal rates of loss 
 
 
Marginal rate of loss  
(in %) 
State Acronym 1998 2001 2004 
Schleswig-Holstein  SH 42.95 87.85 87.84 
Hamburg HH 91.20 91.50 82.92 
Lower Saxony  NI 85.03 87.81 87.17 
Bremen HB 91.61 91.62 91.62 
North Rhine-Westphalia  NW 70.93 70.37 70.54 
Hesse HE 80.80 79.92 80.59 
Rhineland-Palatine RP 87.16 87.17 87.16 
Baden-Württemberg BW 78.88 78.02 77.55 
Bavaria BV 73.41 77.66 76.63 
Saarland SL 91.86 91.87 91.88 
Berlin BE 89.81 89.84 89.84 
Brandenburg BB 90.98 90.97 90.99 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania MV 91.44 91.46 91.49 
Saxony SN 89.83 89.90 89.96 
Saxony-Anhalt ST 90.91 90.97 91.03 
Thuringia TH 91.04 91.08 91.11 
Note. Own calculations. 
  
Table 3a. Sample statistics - unmarried 
 
1998 2001 2004 
















(Fraction in %) 
SH 27,484 1,824 32,850 32,883 2,070 31,094 28,623 1,644 34,006 
 (26,386) (2,975) (69.23) (32,188) (3,130) (70.98) (29,158) (2,482) (68.21) 
HH 31,083 1,775 31,159 38,913 1,873 29,658 34,211 1,610 29,589 
 (30,321) (3,254) (59.31) (37,268) (3,250) (64.77) (34,436) (2,888) (65.64) 
NI 28,450 1,920 51,525 35,833 2,122 48,044 29,222 1,645 66,430 
 (28,930) (2,974) (65.37) (36,342) (3,523) (68.59) (30,709) (2,474) (69.61) 
HB 25,093 1,648 15,752 29,073 1,876 14,190 26,003 1,551 12,291 
 (22,447) (2,576) (59.12) (26,485) (2,952) (63.86) (24,786) (2,426) (64.08) 
NW 35,270 2,235 76,152 47,609 2,453 76,364 35,467 1,882 123,322 
 (35,872) (3,596) (63.16) (44,492) (3,810) (69.82) (36,718) (2,994) (68.86) 
HE 32,554 2,008 48,493 44,948 2,276 49,599 36,552 1,847 63,861 
 (32,585) (3,158) (68.69) (42,417) (3,459) (73.90) (37,018) (2,861) (73.68) 
RP 27,305 1,873 36,780 34,047 2,030 34,036 28,385 1,632 42,999 
 (26,519) (2,880) (67.88) (33,571) (3,037) (71.01) (29,032) (2,614) (71.94) 
BW 31,858 1,852 60,760 43,413 2,043 59,993 34,001 1,650 90,292 
 (32,543) (3,155) (66.65) (41,682) (3,399) (71.97) (35,135) (2,902) (71.32) 
BY 33,572 1,922 69,023 47,433 2,341 70,747 35,568 1,744 109,521 
 (34,455) (3,202) (69.40) (44,373) (3,768) (73.27) (36,807) (2,887) (73.91) 
SL 23,606 1,400 17,812 27,966 1,577 16,625 25,552 1,283 15,814 
 (20,924) (2,367) (85.55) (25,943) (2,558) (86.72) (24,207) (2,070) (86.99) 
BE 28,357 1,685 40,933 35,559 1,877 38,623 30,322 1,664 43,887 
 (27,896) (2,812) (59.08) (35,573) (3,106) (65.58) (32,242) (2,856) (66.15) 
BB 22,087 2,173 28,779 26,828 2,401 26,585 23,617 2,112 31,246 
 (20,486) (2,441) (68.15) (26,724) (2,626) (73.68) (24,298) (2,262) (76.08) 
MV 20,128 2,196 22,677 24,043 2,323 21,172 22,089 2,001 21,987 
 (17,948) (2,466) (68.43) (22,913) (2,517) (71.62) (22,229) (2,272) (73.14) 
SN 21,143 1,799 34,366 26,450 2,032 32,446 22,286 1,719 44,281 
 (20,195) (2,294) (68.64) (27,075) (2,487) (71.67) (23,690) (2,102) (72.71) 
ST 20,960 2,028 26,138 24,855 2,291 24,406 22,053 2,025 28,450 
 (19,226) (2,347) (66.78) (24,320) (2,504) (71.27) (22,277) (2,219) (73.41) 
TH 19,843 1,973 25,446 23,887 2,243 24,761 21,062 1,733 28,803 
 (17,753) (2,326) (70.10) (23,494) (2,573) (74.09) (21,000) (2,042) (73.33) 
Note. Mean taxable base and conditional mean discretionary deductions. Standard deviations for taxable base and deduction in parentheses. Values in price-adjusted 
EUR per year. Fraction gives the share of tax units in the respective group with strictly positive discretionary deductions. 
Data. FAST 1998-2004. 
  
Table 3b. Sample statistics - married 
 
1998 2001 2004 
















(Fraction in %) 
SH 65,302 2,388 36,266 77,407 2,686 37,864 73,079 2,316 37,469 
 (37,282) (3,330) (84.43) (40,901) (3,582) (85.94) (37,962) (3,227) (86.00) 
HH 66,050 2,177 27,630 77,258 2,376 29,980 76,709 2,170 24,014 
 (37,652) (3,132) (77.51) (40,673) (3,667) (83.18) (38,504) (3,426) (83.95) 
NI 71,494 2,496 61,680 84,538 2,844 74,720 76,257 2,323 78,934 
 (38,858) (3,269) (82.60) (39,753) (3,565) (85.74) (37,604) (3,081) (86.47) 
HB 53,174 2,012 13,665 60,795 2,227 13,393 61,010 2,028 8,696 
 (31,881) (2,816) (75.72) (36,106) (3,105) (81.01) (36,580) (2,949) (81.04) 
NW 84,785 2,953 118,014 96,543 3,232 158,886 84,863 2,670 177,571 
 (38,578) (3,803) (84.07) (36,546) (4,075) (88.64) (36,038) (3,440) (88.04) 
HE 76,668 2,761 62,515 90,674 3,147 81,088 83,312 2,699 81,155 
 (39,510) (3,652) (86.88) (39,369) (3,813) (90.19) (37,122) (3,439) (90.14) 
RP 65,678 2,427 42,676 78,173 2,855 48,757 73,170 2,380 48,334 
 (37,660) (3,221) (84.76) (40,591) (7,351) (88.22) (37,922) (3,228) (88.06) 
BW 79,002 2,432 81,450 92,609 2,792 111,335 83,775 2,328 123,704 
 (38,818) (3,568) (85.86) (37,542) (3,769) (89.46) (35,639) (3,257) (89.37) 
BY 80,906 2,636 92,867 94,539 3,037 129,718 83,799 2,487 140,461 
 (39,133) (3,804) (86.80) (37,299) (3,934) (89.68) (36,308) (3,398) (90.22) 
SL 53,180 2,059 17,840 62,179 2,361 18,256 62,343 1,960 14,163 
 (32,056) (2,799) (88.69) (36,747) (3,028) (89.08) (36,664) (2,798) (94.08) 
BE 65,665 2,298 33,573 77,338 2,645 36,635 74,422 2,368 31,067 
 (37,266) (3,217) (79.47) (40,098) (3,504) (84.50) (38,264) (3,449) (85.51) 
BB 55,305 2,567 25,473 66,900 3,151 27,174 66,104 2,675 25,245 
 (33,906) (2,836) (79.70) (38,467) (3,291) (85.14) (38,052) (2,953) (87.11) 
MV 50,163 2,378 19,679 58,811 2,707 19,624 58,153 2,306 16,046 
 (30,924) (2,722) (79.40) (35,519) (2,985) (82.39) (36,132) (2,742) (83.73) 
SN 55,116 2,128 30,447 66,985 2,545 32,145 64,573 2,196 32,802 
 (34,335) (2,625) (80.99) (38,824) (3,037) (84.96) (37,903) (2,893) (85.52) 
ST 51,205 2,169 23,002 60,424 2,682 22,758 62,646 2,271 22,047 
 (32,004) (2,432) (77.40) (36,524) (2,969) (82.57) (37,627) (2,592) (84.35) 
TH 49,681 2,205 21,923 59,961 2,607 22,416 58,985 2,080 20,345 
 (31,338) (2,588) (80.92) (36,481) (2,931) (84.34) (36,801) (2,546) (85.01) 
Note. Mean taxable base and conditional mean discretionary deductions. Standard deviations for taxable base and deduction in parentheses. Values in price-adjusted 
EUR per year. Fraction gives the share of tax units in the respective group with strictly positive discretionary deductions. 
Data. FAST 1998-2004. 
  
Table 4. Heckman regression results 
 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 
Outcome equation          
MRL 7.898*** (2.634) 7.167*** (2.488) 6.349*** (2.436) 6.616*** (2.449) 
Contributor 6.783*** (2.295) 6.202*** (2.177) 5.524*** (2.127) 5.735*** (2.137) 
MRL x Contributor -7.826*** (2.622) -7.175*** (2.492) -6.416*** (2.433) -6.671*** (2.444) 
City state 0.086 (0.088) 0.082 (0.077) 0.079 (0.069) 0.055 (0.067) 
MRL x City state -0.118 (0.102) -0.108 (0.090) -0.106 (0.080) -0.080 (0.078) 
Lump sum -0.091** (0.044) -0.093** (0.039) -0.099*** (0.033) -0.104*** (0.034) 
Year_2001 0.046** (0.020) 0.052*** (0.020) 0.038** (0.019) 4.959*** (0.632) 
Year_2004 -0.062*** (0.018) -0.066*** (0.016) -0.103*** (0.015) 6.981*** (0.619) 
ln(TB) 0.350*** (0.030) 0.435*** (0.024) 0.404*** (0.022) 0.362*** (0.016) 
Controls for number of 
children and age no  yes  yes  yes  
Controls for income 
sources 
no  no  yes  yes  
Time interaction of 
micro variables no  no  no  yes  
Constant -4.262* (2.297) -4.568** (2.189) -3.615* (2.142) -3.375 (2.126) 
Selection equation          
MRL 3.006** (1.422) 3.612** (1.407) 3.475** (1.402) 3.611*** (1.389) 
Contributor 2.473** (1.262) 2.984** (1.250) 2.904** (1.239) 3.021** (1.229) 
MRL x Contributor -2.780* (1.438) -3.368** (1.427) -3.287** (1.411) -3.419** (1.399) 
City state 0.038 (0.044) 0.057 (0.048) 0.059 (0.048) 0.054 (0.049) 
MRL x City state -0.069 (0.051) -0.090 (0.056) -0.092* (0.056) -0.088 (0.057) 
Lump sum 0.005 (0.026) 0.001 (0.029) -0.008 (0.026) -0.011 (0.026) 
Year_2001 0.063*** (0.014) 0.057*** (0.015) 0.050*** (0.015) -1.085*** (0.258) 
Year_2004 0.122*** (0.014) 0.121*** (0.016) 0.092*** (0.015) -0.520 (0.351) 
ln(TB) 0.371*** (0.010) 0.409*** (0.009) 0.384*** (0.008) 0.372*** (0.008) 
Married 0.252*** (0.021) 0.188*** (0.016) 0.154*** (0.017) 0.181*** (0.024) 
Controls for number of 
children and age no  yes  yes  yes  
Controls for income 
sources 
no  no  yes  yes  
Time interaction of 
micro variables no  no  no  yes  
Constant -5.893*** (1.272) -6.975*** (1.258) -6.751*** (1.245) -6.760*** (1.225) 
Mills λ  0.433  0.368  0.316  0.217  
ρ  0.298  0.258  0.227  0.159  
2Pr ob χ>  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
BIC 16690173  16546309  16322992  16220926  
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Number of observation is 4,459,269; number of censored observations is 933,954; 
number of uncensored observations is 3,525,315. 







Table A1. Discretionary deductions 
 
Paragraph Technical term Content 
§9 EStG 
Werbungskosten (c65172, c65173); 
berücksichtigt sind nur solche, die 
Pauschbetrag übersteigen 
Amount of employment-related expenses 
exceeding the blanket allowance (§9a 
EStG) 
§10 Para. 1 No. 1 EStG Sonderausgaben: Unterhaltsleistungen (c65401) Special expenses: alimony payment 
§10 Para. 1 No. 8 EStG 
Sonderausgaben: Aufwendungen für 
hauswirtschaftliche 
Beschäftigungsverhältnisse (c65431) 
Special expenses: Expenses for hired 
labor in the household 
§10 EStG Sonderausgaben: Steuerberatungskosten (c65409) Special expenses: Expenses for tax advice  
§10 EStG No. 7 Sonderausgaben: Ausbildungs- und Weiterbildungskosten (c65410) 
Special expenses: Expenses for further 
education 
§10 Para. 1 No. 9 EStG Sonderausgaben: Schulgeld (c65432) Special expenses: Tuition fees  
§10b EStG Beiträge und Spenden (c65411) Contributions and donations 
§33a Para. 2 EStG Außergewöhnliche Belastungen: Ausbildungskosten (c65472) 
Extraordinary burden: expenses for 
training costs  




Extraordinary burden: domestic aid, 
residential care 
Note. EStG denotes German Income Tax Code (Einkommensteuergesetz). Own tabulation. 
 
Table A2. Heckman with country dummies 
 
 1998 2001 2004 
    
  Outcome equation 
SH  0.070*** (0.006) 0.146*** (0.008) 0.119*** (0.004) 
HH -0.047*** (0.004) -0.067*** (0.007) -0.039*** (0.003) 
NI 0.123*** (0.007) 0.180*** (0.004) 0.141*** (0.003) 
HB -0.132*** (0.009) -0.084*** (0.014) -0.062*** (0.009) 
NW 0.197*** (0.003) 0.161*** (0.003) 0.154*** (0.001) 
HE 0.171*** (0.003) 0.183*** (0.003) 0.190*** (0.002) 
RP 0.110*** (0.006) 0.127*** (0.007) 0.113*** (0.005) 
BY 0.074*** (0.001) 0.139*** (0.001) 0.115*** (0.001) 
SL -0.046*** (0.018) 0.030 (0.019) -0.008 (0.015) 
BE 0.025*** (0.008) 0.087*** (0.010) 0.101*** (0.007) 
BB 0.466*** (0.019) 0.578*** (0.019) 0.589*** (0.017) 
MV 0.452*** (0.021) 0.489*** (0.022) 0.473*** (0.018) 
SN 0.257*** (0.019) 0.312*** (0.019) 0.308*** (0.017) 
ST 0.346*** (0.020) 0.458*** (0.022) 0.453*** (0.018) 
TH 0.342*** (0.021) 0.433*** (0.023) 0.328*** (0.019) 
ln(TB) 0.322*** (0.025) 0.337*** (0.028) 0.322*** (0.024) 
Controls for income 
components yes  yes  yes  
Controls for age and 
children no  no  no  
Constant 2.715*** (0.273) 2.565*** (0.313) 2.527*** (0.267) 
      Selection equation 
SH 0.077*** (0.004) -0.006 (0.004) -0.061*** (0.002) 
HH -0.244*** (0.003) -0.213*** (0.004) -0.187*** (0.003) 
NI -0.048*** (0.006) -0.089*** (0.003) -0.045*** (0.002) 
HB -0.225*** (0.005) -0.197*** (0.006) -0.194*** (0.004) 
NW -0.115*** (0.002) -0.069*** (0.002) -0.068*** (0.001) 
HE 0.055*** (0.001) 0.047*** (0.001) 0.052*** (0.001) 
RP 0.057*** (0.004) 0.034*** (0.004) 0.042*** (0.003) 
BY 0.062*** (0.001) 0.012*** (0.001) 0.072*** (0.001) 
SL 0.529*** (0.007) 0.418*** (0.007) 0.580*** (0.005) 
BE -0.198*** (0.005) -0.159*** (0.005) -0.112*** (0.004) 
BB 0.019** (0.009) 0.058*** (0.009) 0.151*** (0.007) 
MV 0.034*** (0.011) -0.005 (0.011) 0.060*** (0.008) 
SN 0.062*** (0.010) 0.026*** (0.010) 0.074*** (0.008) 
ST -0.024** (0.010) -0.007 (0.011) 0.058*** (0.008) 
TH 0.102*** (0.011) 0.084*** (0.011) 0.089*** (0.009) 
ln(TB) 0.374*** (0.013) 0.341*** (0.009) 0.365*** (0.009) 
Married 0.189*** (0.018) 0.244*** (0.025) 0.237*** (0.019) 
Controls for income 
components yes  yes  yes  
Controls for age and 
children no  no  no  
Constant -3.446*** (0.135) -3.048*** (0.101) -3.304*** (0.094) 
Mills λ  0.410  0.376  0.381  
ρ  0.290  0.266  0.272  
2Pr ob χ>  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Number of observation is 4,459,269; number of censored observations is 
933,954; number of uncensored observations is 3,525,315. State acronyms are introduced in Table 2. 
Data. FAST 1998-2004. 
 
 Table A3. Heckman regression results without Schleswig-Holstein 
 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 
Outcome equation          
MRL 7.806*** (2.563) 7.712*** (2.530) 7.127*** (2.443) 7.046*** (2.452) 
Contributor 6.825*** (2.244) 6.747*** (2.221) 6.309*** (2.161) 6.222*** (2.163) 
MRL x Contributor -7.915*** (2.578) -7.822*** (2.554) -7.336*** (2.491) -7.234*** (2.493) 
Citystate 0.077 (0.086) 0.086 (0.084) 0.075 (0.077) 0.053 (0.082) 
MRL x Citystate -0.108 (0.101) -0.116 (0.098) -0.098 (0.090) -0.075 (0.095) 
Lumpsum -0.105** (0.042) -0.105** (0.042) -0.105*** (0.040) -0.098** (0.040) 
Year_2001 0.049** (0.023) 0.049** (0.022) 0.053** (0.023) 0.066*** (0.024) 
Year_2004 -0.061*** (0.020) -0.056*** (0.020) -0.067*** (0.019) 0.178*** (0.014) 
ln(TB) 0.347*** (0.032) 0.332*** (0.033) 0.432*** (0.025) 0.436*** (0.025) 
Controls for number of 
children no  yes  yes  yes  
Controls for age of tax 
unit members no  no  yes  yes  
Time interaction of 
micro variables no  no  no  yes  
Constant -4.134* (2.237) -3.940* (2.213) -4.490** (2.152) -4.566** (2.158) 
Selection equation          
MRL 2.766** (1.401) 2.677* (1.433) 3.361** (1.379) 3.352** (1.381) 
Contributor 1.746 (1.204) 1.666 (1.227) 2.224* (1.182) 2.211* (1.186) 
MRL x Contributor -1.877 (1.370) -1.782 (1.396) -2.424* (1.347) -2.408* (1.351) 
Citystate 0.047 (0.038) 0.051 (0.037) 0.066 (0.040) 0.061 (0.041) 
MRL x Citystate -0.083* (0.045) -0.087* (0.045) -0.104** (0.048) -0.098** (0.049) 
Lumpsum 0.017 (0.028) 0.019 (0.028) 0.013 (0.031) 0.015 (0.032) 
Year_2001 0.070*** (0.017) 0.069*** (0.017) 0.065*** (0.019) 0.056*** (0.019) 
Year_2004 0.139*** (0.013) 0.144*** (0.013) 0.138*** (0.014) 0.233*** (0.021) 
ln(TB) 0.372*** (0.011) 0.370*** (0.011) 0.410*** (0.011) 0.411*** (0.011) 
Married 0.253*** (0.022) 0.227*** (0.024) 0.188*** (0.017) 0.190*** (0.017) 
Controls for number of 
children no  yes  yes  yes  
Controls for age of tax 
unit members no  no  yes  yes  
Time interaction of 
micro variables no  no  no  yes  
Constant -5.697*** (1.258) -5.626*** (1.286) -6.770*** (1.237) -6.803*** (1.236) 
Mills λ  0.431  0.420  0.365  0.366  
ρ  0.297  0.290  0.257  0.258  
2Pr ob χ>  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Number of observation is 4,249,720; number of censored observations is 887,965; 
number of uncensored observations is 3,361,755. 
Data. FAST 1998-2004. 
 
 
 
 
